

The Defense Business Board (DBB) is a federal advisory committee within the Department of Defense (DoD) pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, the Government in Sunshine Act of 1976 and other appropriate federal regulations. The DBB meets quarterly and held its first public session for the fiscal year 2010 on January 21, 2010 from 9:00 AM to 11:00 AM.

#### **DBB Members Present**

Bayer, Michael (Chairman) Brown, Owsley Chao, Pierre Gross, Pat Goodman, John (Vice Chairman) Jennings, Madelyn Langstaff, David Levin, Lon Odeen, Phil Ronald, Mark Spencer, Richard Stein, Bobby Toll, Bob Walker, Kevin Wright, Joe Zakheim, Dov

Observing were DBB Nominees Fernando Amandi, Bonnie Cohen, and Wahid Hamid.

Also observing were DBB Observers Gene Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General for the Government Accountability Office, (GAO) and Jeffrey Zients, Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Also observing and presenting their work on DBB Task Groups were DBB Senior Fellows:

Albert, Neil Barrett, Barbara Bovin, Denis Kimsey, Jim Phillips, Bill

Zoeller, Jack

#### **DBB Staff in attendance:**

Ferguson, Phyllis, Executive Director Van Niman, Kelly, Deputy Director Bohn, Michael (CAPT, USN) DBB Military Assistant



Doxey, Kevin (COL, USA) DBB Military Assistant Marks, Dale (Col, USAF) DBB Military Assistant Sakura, Kathleen (Col USAF) DBB Military Assistant Duffy, Debbie, Staff Assistant Cole, Samuel, Contractor Tolliver, Georgiann, Contractor

#### **Public Session Attendees:**

Aponte, Ricardo (BG Ret), Exec Dir, COCESS Trade Alliance

Atkins, Paige, Dir, Def Spectrum Org

Beadner, Dave, Space Operations Div, HQ USAF/A30-SO

Bennett, Jon, Defense News

Bennett, John, TRG

Etherton, Jonathan, Etherton and Assoc, Inc

Hazlett, Stuart; Office of Deputy Undersecretary for Acquisition and Technology

Jost, Ron, DASD for C2 & Spectrum

Lambert, Brett, DUSD (IP)

Legacy, Rick, NSSO

Lima, Peter, ASD/NII

Madson, Jeremy, Professional Services Council

Marrone, Christian, Office of the Secretary of Defense

McCarthy, Ryan, Office of the Secretary of Defense

McKnight, Steven, GC, The Rhoads Group

Merrill, Albers, Aerospace Corp

Myers, Angela, Executive Office of the President

Parks, Polly, Southern Recycling--EMR USA

Polzak, Benton, The Rehancement Group, Inc

Prakash, Om (Col, USAF) Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Industrial Policy

Price, Danny, Director, Spectrum & Communications Policy

Shafovaloff, Garry, DAU

Sheikh, Fawzia, Inside the Pentagon

#### PUBLIC SESSION

Copies of the final approved briefing charts may be viewed at the DBB website under Reports for 2010.

At 11:00 AM, Mr. Bayer opened the public session by providing opening remarks. Ms. Phyllis Ferguson, the Designated Federal Officer officially opened the meeting.

Addressing Benefit Disparities for Wounded Warriors

Mr. Kimsey presented the draft findings and recommendations of the DBB Task Group on Wounded Warriors. This Task Group looked at the disparity between the benefits offered to wounded warriors who have requested and were approved to remain



on active duty, with those who otherwise would have retired due to their injuries. Mr. Kimsey recounted the experience of a Wounded Warrior, who is on active duty, and is denied access to many of the benefits offered to other wounded veterans simply because he has chosen to remain on active duty, for example, health and education benefits. Mr. Kimsey noted a lack of communication about what benefits are available, and difficulties in accessing Veteran Affairs and education benefits. Mr. Kimsey commented that leaders in DoD and Veterans Affairs are aware of these problems and all agree in principle that these problems should be rectified before they become larger. However, no one person is in charge to address and correct these problems. Mr. Kimsey boiled the dispute down to interpretations of the official authorities of each Department and the assigned authority to address such issues. The DBB noted the importance of identifying an official in charge to fix the disparities.

During the deliberations, Mr. Odeen asked who the right official might be. Mr. Kimsey replied that the Task Group was not making a specific recommendation with regard to selection of the individual, but that the person could come from either DoD or Veterans Affairs. Mr. Toll asked why this problem had not been raised before, especially after World War II. Mr. Bayer responded that perhaps since more recently, DoD allows uniformed personnel to remain longer on active duty after an injury, this practice may account for the increased visibility of this issue. Mr. Bayer called for a motion to approve the recommendations and asked if there were any abstentions. With no abstentions, the DBB passed the recommendations unanimously.

#### Managing DoD Under Sustained Topline Pressures

Dr. Zakheim presented the draft findings and recommendations of the DBB Task Group on Managing Under Top Line Pressure. He opened by commenting that the Department has seen ten years of growth and now must anticipate top line pressure on its budget. DoD is facing a cultural challenge since the leaders and staff of the Department have never dealt with these pressures. The Task Group's findings regarding cyclical budgets were highlighted as well as the challenges presented by ballooning acquisition, overhead, and healthcare costs. The question was posed whether the Department has the necessary skill sets and tools to address and measure these challenges. The inaccuracy and lagging nature of data exacerbates these challenges.

The Task Group concluded that an external impetus was needed to stimulate change, and therefore recommended that two bipartisan commissions be created – one focusing on healthcare and another focusing on overhead. The Task Group also recommended that the DoD's Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) conduct periodic reviews using, timely data, a clear definition of overhead, and clear and common metrics across the enterprise. The Task Group recommended augmenting the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process with a streamlined approach similar to the rapid acquisition process. The Task Group also recommended that the DCMO identify "under-spending" and reward cost savings using a fully burdened manpower cost. To systematize these recommendations, the Deputy Secretary of



Defense should direct the DCMO to utilize the private sector best practices identified in the Task Group report. Lastly, an element critical to execution would be DoD's ability to work with the Office of Personnel and Management to create a new personnel measurement and reward program that uses true measures of performance, such as budget execution, and not just budget preparation.

During the deliberations, Mr. Wright asked if DoD has a plan to operate under a reduced budget. Dr. Zakheim was not aware of any such contingency plan but emphasized that the Board's recommendations would call for such a plan. Mr. Chao asked if the Task Group was making any recommendation as to what the target overhead rate for the Department should be. Dr. Zakheim responded that such analysis was not the focus of this report but that it should be looked at more closely. Mr. Bovin reminded the Board that the Defense Science Board delivered several studies on this topic in the 1990's, and added that implementation of those recommendations was not clearly evident. He questioned what the DBB could do to ensure better execution of its recommendations. Dr. Zakheim hoped that the DBB's clear and concise recommendations would facilitate implementation, and expressed confidence that given the different environment today, people were more willing and able to take action. Mr. Bayer called for a motion to approve the recommendations and asked for any abstentions and with none, the recommendations were approved unanimously.

#### Best Business Practices for Fixed-Price Contracting

Mr. Ronald presented the draft findings and recommendations of the Task Group on Best Practices for Fixed-Price Contracting. The Task Group looked at better utilizing fixed-price contracting and offered recommendations for guidelines on its use. Mr. Ronald commented that private sector best practices were applicable to DoD in this area since both seek to acquire/develop high technology systems. Mr. Ronald stressed the importance of looking at history, lest DoD be destined to repeat the mistakes of the past. History shows that neither extreme (all fixed price or all cost plus) is an optimum solution for DoD.

He reminded the Board that current DoD policy states a preference for fixed-price contracting, but a problem with this policy is that it refers to "risk" without clearly defining what "risk" means. Interpretations of risk vary widely across acquisition organizations, which rely on a preferred contract type, not linking contract type to what is being procured. Mr. Ronald highlighted the many isolated cases of actions underway to bring clarity and consistency to contracting, such as Peer Reviews, and emphasized that these efforts needed to be institutionalized. Industry, like DoD, generally prefers fixed-price contracting, but differs on when to apply it because of a difference of interpretation of risk. The Task Group summarized the many challenges in defense contracting, with contract type not being the biggest problem. The Task Group noted there is less oversight of services contracting, despite the large amount of dollars spent in this area, and the lack of flexibility within multi-year services contracts to switch to fixed-price contracting.



The Task Group's recommendations focused on delineating a hierarchy of contracts, and better defining the term risk by relating it to Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) – standard definitions with which industry and DoD are familiar and comfortable. The Task Group also recommended an independent review of TRL by the new Director of the office of Cost Analysis and Program Estimating since they also review cost realism. The recommendations call for a more pro-active use of award-fee contracts. To help ensure implementation, the Task Group called for these guidelines to be put into DoD Instructions; that the Deputy Secretary direct the Service Acquisition Executives to align their policies and programs with these guidelines; and that the Defense Acquisition University develop an on-line mandatory learning module and metrics to measure and track enforcement.

During the deliberations Mr. Dodaro, Acting Comptroller GAO and DBB Observer, stated that the Task Group's findings and recommendations were very consistent with recent GAO findings and recommendations, especially with respect to TRLs. Mr. Zients, Deputy for Management, OMB and also a DBB Observer stated that the recommendations were consistent with the spirit of President Obama's March 2009 guidance, and would be very helpful to OMB. He noted that it was very important for DoD to meet their goals with respect to cost savings, since most of the government's acquisition dollars were with Defense, and emphasized the importance of making investments in the acquisition workforce to develop the necessary capabilities. Mr. Dodaro echoed Mr. Zient's comment, saying this was especially true with respect to the services acquisition workforce.

Ms. Cohen questioned the basis for the Task Group's recommendation to require service contracts over \$1 billion to be broken into smaller tasks. Mr. Ronald replied that the Task Group based the recommended threshold on their professional experience. Mr. Odeen presented an opposing viewpoint on services contracting, noting that in his opinion, Time-and-Material (T&M) contracts should be preferred, and that cost-plus contracts offered no incentive to control costs. Mr. Ronald explained that such a view was not the consensus of the Task Group's review, noting that T&M contracts offer an incentive to control manpower and that these contracts find it easy to add hours to these contracts – masking cost overruns. He further explained to the contrary that cost-plus contracts have a dollar limit to control cost overruns. Mr. Neil Albert, a Task Group member, clarified that the Task Group was not suggesting that T&M contracts should never be used. For example, when there is no clear timeframe, T&M contracts are best. On the other hand, if enough information is known on what is expected to be delivered, a fixed-price contract is often best. Mr. Ronald elaborated with an example of software development explaining that if a T&M contract is used, there is no guarantee of delivery, whereas with a cost-plus contract, DoD would at least be guaranteed receipt of what they purchased. Mr. Bayer called for a motion to approve the recommendations and asked if there were any abstentions. Mr. Toll abstained, and the recommendations were approved.

Recommendations for Insourcing the Acquisition Workforce



Ms. Jennings presented the draft findings and recommendations of the DBB Task Group on Insourcing the Acquisition Workforce. Their overall task was to present a strategy for the Department to bring outsourced jobs back to DoD. Ms. Jennings thanked the Defense Acquisition University for their help to the Task Group. By way of background, Ms. Jennings noted that a 15% growth in the acquisition workforce would only restore the workforce back to its 1990 level. The overall objective of DoD's initiative is to bring back the workforce that is inherently governmental and/or core to DoD missions. She also stated that DoD is assuming that insourcing will result in a cost savings.

The Task Group identified many challenges associated with the overall acquisition workforce growth: (1) by the year 2015, 40% of the acquisition workforce will be newly-hired; (2) as previously reported in the DBB's report on "Review of the National Security Personnel System," DoD is currently not well managed because managers tend to view themselves as "action officers", not supervisors, and with this large number of new hires, strong supervision will be required; and finally, (3) culturally shaping an organization takes years and DoD needs culture change now. Although there have been numerous studies to date, none have corrected the underlying problems related to acquisition workforce. However, a recent GAO study citing a lack of acquisition workforce data has led the DoD to develop preliminary workforce competency modeling. Ms. Jennings noted the enormity and importance of the acquisition workforce initiative stating that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L) hasn't hired a generation in a generation.

In light of these challenges, the Task Group recommended that the Deputy Secretary prioritize the insourcing project and broadly communicate a strategy in a positive manner. To ensure execution, the Task Group also recommended that the Deputy Secretary appoint a Director of Human Capital as a dedicated, full-time position to oversee and manage the OUSD(AT&L) workforce growth and development. This person should serve as a direct report to the USD (AT&L). Ms. Jennings noted that Mr. Frank Anderson, President of Defense Acquisition University has done a better-than-commendable job but noted he is serving in a dual-hatted position. The acquisition workforce growth project requires a dedicated, full-time director modeled after the similar position in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Ms. Jennings noted that an essential part of execution will be the development of a robust strategy to track and measure outcomes. Also, DoD will need to focus on developing and improving the managerial workforce. Lastly, the Task Group called on the USD(AT&L) to inspire the acquisition workforce by reinforcing the value proposition of working for DoD Acquisition. The Task Group challenged DoD to define its core values as is done in the private sector. Ms. Jennings cited a Gallup poll that said DoD is perceived as one of the most important agencies within the federal government (alongside of the Central Intelligence Agency). A critically important agency, DoD is facing a time of strategic inflection, and must change its' focus – bigger isn't better, better is better.



During the deliberations, Mr. Phillips, a member of the Task Group, echoed Ms. Jennings' comments and emphasized the important opportunity DoD has to bring needed talent into DoD. The challenge, he explained, will not be hiring the 20,000 people, but rather to bring in the right people to make the acquisition process better. Mr. Zients, DBB's OMB Observer, agreed that more quality metrics are needed to measure success. Mr. Dodaro, DBB's GAO Observer suggested that DoD has to define what it wants and set a framework to achieve it. Mr. Walker asked what analysis was done to develop an overarching strategy to insource these 10,000 people. Ms. Jennings replied that DoD is doing competency modeling and has identified competency gaps, however there are no metrics on the quality of hires. Mr. Langstaff reminded the Board that the in private sector, one would want to avoid "stupid competition" and would rather develop informed customers. He noted the benefits to industry if DoD were more informed. He also noted that there are former government employees who were short of hitting their 20 years of service that might want to return to government service and that DoD should see this as an opportunity to hire experienced talent. Mr. Chao noted that the problem is further exacerbated by the upcoming wave of retirements facing DoD. DoD will need a large cadre of mid-level people so a review of revolving door limits is reasonable, and DoD could consider using outside recruiters as is done in the private sector.

Mr. Ronald complemented the Task Group's excellent work and clarified that in reality there are 20-30 different acquisition workforces, (e.g., among the three Military Services and DoD acquisition components) with little movement across these workforces. However, he recommended treating the entire population as a group because DoD will need to utilize this entire population to address the gaps. Mr. Ronald recommended emphasizing this point in the DBB's final report. Mr. Bayer called for a motion to approve the recommendations and asked if there were any abstentions. Without any abstentions, the board unanimously approved the recommendations.

#### Assessing the Defense Industrial Base

Mr. Odeen presented the draft findings and recommendations of the Task Group on Assessing the Defense Industrial Base. Based on the possibility of DoD entering a period of downturned budgets, the Task Group considered how industry might react to such a downturn, and offered recommendations for how DoD could prepare to mitigate any negative impacts. The Task Group outlined a range of industry reactions from mergers and acquisitions, to expanding customer bases, to diversification into the commercial sector and/or international markets, to exiting the market altogether. Mr. Odeen stated that industry reactions will depend on the extent of DoD reductions – greater reductions will lead to less investment and spending by industry.

The Task Group concluded that the services industry would be impacted less by such reductions since they are funded through Operational and Maintenance (O&M) and their workforces have more fungible skill sets. Mr. Odeen provided an overview of the



Task Group's predictions for various impacts that different industry reactions might have for DoD:

- If companies do nothing/go private, they would be less responsive to DoD
- If companies diversify their products/services, there would be less management focus on defense products/services
- If companies merge, there would be a lack of competition in that sector (and the problems that entails), and most likely Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) issues would arise
- If companies leave the defense market, DoD might not have access to the high technology it needs, although that technology may be available in the private sector
- If companies go international, DoD might not have access to the technology because of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions

In sum, if DoD is relying heavily on access to technology, then all of these potential scenarios illustrate the importance of addressing this issue. Although the Task Group felt that the services sector might be impacted less by a downturn budget, the increasing importance of services like connectivity and software, and the vertical integration of services companies, (i.e., cases where hardware companies are forced to sell their services components because of OCI problems), are increasing the possibility that they too will be greatly impacted by a downturn budget.

Mr. Odeen presented the Task Group's recommendations, emphasizing the need for DoD to segment industries when assessing the industrial base and to utilize different tools for analyzing each sector. The Task Group recommended an array of tools for doing this in the appendix of their report. Mr. Odeen also stressed the importance of developing clear competition policies for each industrial sector to ensure that critical sectors are preserved. For example, to ensure that the services sector is preserved, the Task Group recommended focusing on OCI rules, and using "best value" contracts, not just the best cost. Mr. Odeen mentioned the critical role of contractors on the battlefield as a rationale for the recommendation to involve them in contingency planning processes.

During the deliberations, Mr. Dodaro complimented the Task Group's work and mentioned that the GAO has recommended setting similar priorities for acquisition portfolios. Mr. Langstaff acknowledged that innovation can be a casualty of a budget downturn. In his view, the defense industrial base is comprised of both very large or very small companies and not so many mid-sized companies. He suggested that DoD consider increasing the number of middle-size companies to preserve innovation. Mr. Odeen responded that from his experience, the smaller companies are more agile and innovative, and that innovative people are attracted to the smaller companies.

Mr. Goodman asked if the Task Group considered the magnitude of internal change required under these scenarios. Mr. Odeen responded that such a review was outside the scope of this study, but that the Office of Industrial Policy within



OUSD(AT&L) is the organization where such studies on the industrial base would likely be performed. Mr. Chao echoed the importance for utilizing new tools to assess the industrial base given the limited inventory that exists today. Elaborating on Mr. Langstaff's earlier point, Mr. Bovin commented that mid-tier companies are disappearing because of DoD policies and practices – they can't survive DoD cuts and program changes. Mr. Wright emphasized the importance of DoD being able to communicate with industry, something they have been reluctant to do in the past. Mr. Odeen agreed, stating that the DBB's July 2009 study made recommendations to address this problem (DBB Report FY09-07). Mr. Bayer called for a motion to approve the recommendations and asked if there were any abstentions. Without any abstentions, the Board approved the recommendations.

#### Spectrum Management

Mr. Wright presented the draft findings and recommendations of the DBB Task Group on Spectrum Management. Mr. Wright thanked Mr. John Stenbit of the Defense Science Board (DSB) for his assistance as co-Chair of this Task Group. The DSB was asked to support this task because of the technical component, but the overall task was focused on management issues. He also gave special thanks to Paige Atkins, Ron Jost, and Danny Price for their assistance providing background information for the Task Group.

Mr. Wright opened his comments by stating that he was uncomfortable using the word "crisis" but in this case, the Department was facing an impending crisis. He explained, that the reality is that time is running out to ensure DoD has the one thing it needs for modern warfare – spectrum. He further explained that if DoD is going to train as it fights, it must address this problem. Mr. Wright noted that currently, limited spectrum is already causing interference with defense systems, and that the problem is further compounded by the growing global demand for more spectrum. Cell phone companies are demanding more spectrum, which they currently get from DoD. DoD now must defend its spectrum inventory, an inventory that has classified information attached to it, creating even larger problems. Mr. Wright further explained that DoD does not own the solution –there are many actors involved. He commented on the National Broadband Plan that is calling for equitable distribution of spectrum, and questioned how such a scenario would impact DoD. He stated that the Federal Spectrum Plan is seen as a "wish list"—not an actual Federal Strategy for spectrum. Mr. Wright pointed out that his Task Group, after asking several DoD offices, could not obtain data on exactly how spectrum is currently used in DoD, nor could the Task Group obtain specific data on DoD's projected demand. The Task Group noted that this lack of data was indicative of the huge problem facing DoD.

The Task Group observed there is no coordinated approach to spectrum management in the inter-agency and spectrum is not seen as a tangible asset. Rather, it is looked upon as free – until it runs out. Mr. Wright stated that the time is upon the DoD to act now. Mr. Wright pointed out earlier that DoD does not own the solution and so DoD



cannot control the implementation of a plan to better manage spectrum. Within DoD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (NII) is responsible for planning and the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is responsible for management. In the Task Group's opinion, DoD cannot afford to take spectrum and hold it for contingency operations or crises.

Therefore, the Task Group recommended DoD develop and implement management efficiencies, update the spectrum database, and create a stronger oversight office to oversee and coordinate spectrum management. To improve interagency coordination and a better allocation of spectrum, the Task Group recommended DoD use new management tools such as standardizing databases and streamlining operational assignment tools.

The Task Group also called for DoD to support National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) as the lead federal entity to prioritize spectrum. Mr. Wright noted this agency cannot replace White House leadership, and implied that White House leadership was needed on this issue. To lessen DoD's demand for spectrum, the Task Group recommended (1) pursuing adaptable RF systems to provide a dynamic capability, and (2) developing new technologies and capabilities, such as plugging into fiber, where practical, in order to lessen DoD's reliance on RF spectrum. The Task Group also recommended DoD consider using higher frequencies, trading fiber for RF, and developing spectrum-sharing agreements with the commercial sector.

Ultimately, Mr. Wright stated that strategic changes are needed to reduce DoD's reliance on RF spectrum. He stressed that while a long-term solution is needed, DoD needed to be proactive today to maintain their ability for modern warfare in the future. Mr. Wright noted that pursuing recommendations one and two above will not likely result in meeting expected RF spectrum demand, and thus the Task Group also recommended DoD pursue strategic changes that decrease DoD reliance on RF spectrum. He noted that the department should challenge the status quo and look for green field technologies. He also recommended development of a top down, proactive strategy for improved use and management of spectrum. Mr. Wright suggested that a future study could focus on "game-changing" technologies that could achieve this long-term objective, and suggested that the DSB lead such a study.

During the deliberations, Mr. Dodaro, DBB's GAO Observer echoed the Task Group's recommendations and stated that this is an area that is in great need of a government-wide solution. Mr. Zients, DBB's OMB Observer thanked the Task Group for their thought-provoking work. Ms. Cohen asked if the Federal Communications Commission's report (on Broadband) that is scheduled to be released in a couple of months might shape this debate. Mr. Wright responded that it probably would, but might not be too favorable for DoD. Mr. Bayer called for a motion to approve the recommendations and asked if there were any abstentions. Mr. Levin abstained and the Board approved the recommendations.





#### **ADJOURNMENT**

Mr. Bayer adjourned the DBB's January 21, 2010 public session at 11:00 AM.

I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the foregoing minutes are accurate and complete.

Michael J. Bayer

Chairman

Defense Business Board