The situation on Ukraine’s eastern front is now very serious. In Avdiivka, it is becoming more critical by the day. After the failure of the attempt to surround it, Russia is fighting its way directly through the city from the southeast and north and is making steady, small advances. This makes the Ukrainian position increasingly untenable because the guns that could stop the advance lack ammunition.
Russia is also attacking west of Bakhmut in the direction of Kostyantynivka. It is about 22km (13.5 miles) from the current front line to Kostyantynivka (pre-war population of 70,000).
Kremlin forces are meanwhile on the offensive west of Kreminna but are making little progress. After reaching the road near Krokhmalne, Russia aims for the Ukrainian positions further north in the direction of Kupiansk.
Success would be significant. By taking the ground as far as the city, Russia would have rolled back the advances of Ukraine’s 2022 counter-offensive and penetrated Kharkiv oblast again, even though Vladimir Putin does not include this territory in his four theoretically annexed oblasts.
As a result of the Russian advances near Kreminna and Bakhmut, the city of Siversk (pre-war population 12,000) is increasingly threatened from three sides, as was previously the case with Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Taken together, these Russian offensives in the east have put Ukraine in its worst situation since the critical phase between April and July 2022. The main reason for this is the serious shortages of artillery ammunition and air defense along the front line.
On February 9, the Financial Times cited a senior NATO official saying: “It is a desperate situation on the front lines for the Ukrainians, far worse than they are letting on.” The Ukrainians themselves say the ammunition famine means Russian shellfire exceeds its own by a factor of 3:1. Expected shipments from Europe and the US have fallen short as EU industry has been slow to raise production and Congress continues to debate the issue.
In the south, Ukraine is trying to keep up the pressure with attacks using Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles and sea drones. Ukraine is concentrating on strikes against Russian logistics, command and control, and communications.
With the impending delivery of the ground-launched small-diameter bomb (GLSDB), the entire coastal strip on the Sea of Azov will also fall within the range of Ukrainian precision weapons. Ukraine will use this to increase its campaign tempo against Russian logistics in the south and in Crimea.
Ukraine needs artillery ammunition in large quantities, howitzers, replacement barrels, and faster repairs for artillery systems. In addition to commitments made for later deliveries, all of Ukraine’s partners should once again, and very quickly, dip deep into their reserves.
It needs further and faster delivery of battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and vehicles that were promised some time ago, as well as new commitments for steady subsequent deliveries.
It will also have to quickly build the ground infrastructure and operational readiness for the F-16s supplied by European partners, which will arrive this year, as well as the long-range air-to-air missiles to equip them.
It requires the delivery of long-range precision weapons, including ATACMS with monobloc warheads, more Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, and German Taurus cruise missiles capable of striking the critical Kerch Bridge linking Russia and occupied Crimea.
Also required are more air defense systems, electronic warfare air defense assistance, faster resupply of guided missiles, and more air defense to protect troops on the front lines.
True, it marks significant progress that the European Union (EU) has now agreed €50bn ($54bn) in aid to Ukraine up to 2027. But the government in Kyiv now needs very strong and vocal signals of European determination beyond this. The unthinkable prospect of declining Ukrainian resistance — which will become more likely if US military assistance remains blocked — would mean a new wave of millions of refugees heading to the EU.
Meanwhile, a strengthening of sanctions enforcement against Russia is critical, and so is the circumvention of sanctions via third countries, which is fueling Russian arms production.
Avdiivka, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, and Kupiansk all face the same future: Russia will seek to advance, paying the price of massive bloodshed and the greatest possible destruction.
It is now in the hands of Ukraine’s European supporters to quickly help with a new military assistance effort, to deny Putin the achievement of his next war aims, and to deter him from further military ambitions beyond Ukraine.
Nico Lange is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is also a Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference in Berlin and Munich and teaches military history at the University of Potsdam. Lange served as Chief of Staff at the German Ministry of Defense from 2019-2022.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
